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INTRODUCTION
In a previous paper
1 I argued that the financial crisis in Asia was radically different from those
that have plagued Latin American since 1982. In simple terms, the Asian crisis was not caused
by excessively large fiscal and trade imbalances leading to inflation, speculative pressure on
overvalued pegged exchange rates and financial sector collapse characteristic of crises in Latin
America. Instead, the crises in Asia were closer to a classic Minsky-Fisher debt-deflation
process built on the  endogenous reductions over time of  risk premia on investments in Asia
that lead to a buildup of short-term commercial bank lending reinforced by interest rate
differentials. The reversal of these flows, initiated by a change in the market perception of
international interest rate movements led to pressure on exchange rate bands that caused the
majority of both corporate and financial borrowers to experience a net present value reversals
and a massive “sale of position to make position” and a downward spiral in asset prices and
exchange rates. In short, a capital account reversal rather than a current account imbalance, was
the source of the Asian problems. The persistence of the downward pressure on prices was
caused by the conversion of virtually every financing unit into a “ponzi” operation, in difference
from a traditional current account crisis in which it is only the relative prices of traded and non-
traded goods that are affected. The rapid upward reassessment of risk premia then led to a
classic Minskyian scenario in which financial institutions cut back sharply on lending as they
struggled to strengthen balance sheets and virtually cut off credit to the economy.
Despite these differences, there was one aspect of the crisis in Asia that was reminiscent
of the experiences in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. That is the rapidity with which the
Thai devaluation spread to other economies in the region that had exhibited what appeared to
strong macroeconomic fundamentals.  Indeed, just as economists were insisting on the
fundamental strength of the Indonesian economy at the end of 1997, those with a long memory
will remember that similar statements were made about the strength of the Brazilian economy
relative to Mexico at the end of 1982. Just as political leaders and economic policy makers in
Asia were slow to accept the possibility of contagion from the Thai crisis because they believed
(perhaps justifiably on the basis of IMF evaluations of their economic fundamentals) that their
economies were fundamentally strong, the same reluctance was present in  Brazil’s reaction to
the 1980s crisis. Indeed, it is interesting to note that just as Indonesia contributed to the IMF led
international rescue package offered to Thailand in July of 1997, Brazil was one of the creditors
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represented in the London Club when Poland declared it was unable to meet its debt service




It was an external interest rate shock that detonated the Minskyian instability in both
Mexico (both in 1982 and 1994) and Thailand. The unraveling of the highly integrated levered
balance sheets of financial institutions and corporate borrowers in Thailand led to the outbreak
of the Minsky crisis in which private agents were forced to liquidate position to make position.
A large proportion of this reaction was simply the scramble for foreign exchange cover by
domestic producers. The process was contagious because of the interlinkages of financial sector
balance sheets and production processes across the region, and indeed across the entire globe.
But, just as the Indonesian crisis was different from the Thai crisis, the Brazilian crisis
differs from the standard Latin American crisis. In the next section we look at the recent history
of the fight to tame Brazilian inertial inflation to identify those factors that produced a particular
strong balance sheet structure in the private sector in Brazil, but caused financial fragility in the
public sector capable of generating a classic debt deflation process.
FIGHTING INERTIAL INFLATION
Brazil’s reaction to the 1980s debt crisis created substantial differences in its economic and
financial structure relative to other Latin American countries.  Brazil had little problem with its
foreign balance. After the 1980s crisis the trade balance remained in surplus from 1983 until
after the introduction of the Real Plan in 1994. This was primarily due to the use of a flexible
exchange rate policy designed to preserve export competitiveness. Although Brazil had a large
public sector debt of around 50% of GDP in 1986, it had not been created by a buildup of a
large stock of private foreign assets (that in many countries was due to capital flight), but rather
was used in large part for the funding of the 2nd National Development Plan which started in
the 1970s to strengthen the internal productive structure of the economy and provide increased
export capacity. Like most other heavily indebted Latin American  countries in the 1980s, the
size of the public debt was increased by the government assuming responsibility after 1982 for
virtually all foreign currency debt contracted by the private sector during the syndicated lending
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boom of the 1970s. The evolution of Brazilian internal debt was strongly influenced by the
persistence of hyperinflation. Falling fiscal revenues due to lags between assessment and
payment were in part offset by the use of a financial transactions tax, while the lags between
budget allocations and expenditures ensured endogenous reductions in real spending.  The result
was a falling ratio of net public sector debt to GDP to around 30% by the time of the Real Plan.
With inflation causing a rapidly decline in the  real value of government debt, it is
difficult to convince the private sector to hold it, and the solution was found in the eventual
introduction of full inflation indexing of government bills with high liquidity. The logical
consequence was that as long as the government had a fiscal imbalance that had to be financed,
there could be no money supply policy independent of this objective. Indeed, given the full
indexing of financial assets, there was a preference for government debt over currency, and
much as occurred in Italy in the same period, the former might be said to have formed the
effective money supply. As a result of the rapid inflation fiscal policy was not a viable policy
tool, nor was money supply control, leaving the interest rate as the only policy tool.  This had a
number of consequences that are not in the annals of conventional economics, but are well
known to economists from countries that have experienced high and persistent or inertial
inflation. First, the interest costs of the outstanding government debt becomes a major
component of government expenditure and thus of the government deficit. This means the
interest rates becomes both a direct and an indirect source of inflation. Further in Latin America
in the 1980s the level of  interest rates relative to the rest of the world had virtually no impact on
capital inflows, since capital markets were characterised by what is euphemistically called
reverse net resource transfers -- i.e. net capital flows were negative so that Brazil was providing
resources to the rest of the world and in particular to the US, irrespective of interest rate
differentials.  There was also no impact of high interest rates on the exchange rate, given the
size of the inflation differential and the policy of active intervention to preserve competitiveness
through devaluation.
The important point of  difference from other Latin American economies was thus that
Brazil was not building up an excessively large imbalance on foreign account, nor was the
exchange rate becoming overvalued, net public debt as a share of gdp was declining, and while
low from historical perspective, its growth rate was on average above other economies in the
region. However, to achieve this result in conditions of hyperinflation and full indexing meant
abandoning active fiscal policy and the impossibility of controlling monetary aggregates. The
only policy tool available to try to stem the hyper inflation was high real interest rates.
However, this interest rates policy reinforced the hyperinflation by causing:
_    a direct increase in the costs of capital since there was no long-term capital market,3
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_  an increase the government deficit, since the outstanding debt was directly linked to
short-term rates.
_    an increase in the rate of inflation through the impact on capital costs and on the fiscal
imbalance.
High interest rates to control inflation reinforced the inflation that spiraled into indexed inertial
hyperinflation, and impeded the full development of private long-term capital markets. Thus
when policies of market liberalisation were introduced to replace the system of government
directed development financing, there was no private sector market structure available to take
its place. The financial system had lived the life of a rentier on the float created by the
adjustment lags in the indexing system of financial contracts.  Indeed, there was hardly any
long-term business financing to be done.  Only the State continued to invest in any appreciable
magnitude and this peculiarly Brazilian characteristic of efficient State financing of  investment
was under increasing attack from the rapid deterioration of government finances and the push
towards increased liberalisation from the multilateral financial institutions and the Collor
government.
The key to breaking out of what was becoming hyperstagflation was thus to find a
substitute for high interest rate policies and reduce the level of interest rates. Two factors
initiated this process. One was the liberalisation of foreign trade introduced by the Collor
regime in 1990, the other was the return of international investment inflows to Latin America at
about the same time. Led by Mexico’s new economic policy introduced by the Salinas
government in 1988, capital flows returned to Latin America after the introduction of the Brady
solution to indebtedness. The Brady plan implicitly accepted that Latin America would never be
able to repay its debts to commercial banks in the short term by increasing net exports, so that it
would have to borrow in private international capital markets to do so. That the return of foreign
capital to Brazil was independent of any changes in domestic conditions can be seen in the fact
that  foreign exchange reserves more than doubled between 1991 and 1992 despite the failure of
the Collor plan to reduce hyperinflation to even two digit levels. These inflows formed the
counterpart to the deterioration in the trade account that was produced by the increased in
imports and reduced exports as foreign competition displaced local producers as the process of
tariff reduction and liberalisation of foreign trade was accelerated.
4  Paradoxically, it was this
process of trade liberalisation and the return of capital flows that provided the background that
allowed for the success of the Real Plan.
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The Real Plan was in many respects similar to the earlier reform plans, including  the
elimination of indexing of wages and prices as a major component, with the nominal exchange
rate the anchor for price stability. Nonetheless, interest rates continued to be the major
instrument of economic policy. What had changed with respect to the previous plans, was that
the Real Plan benefitted from the new post-Brady world of restored capital flows and the
developed country portfolio managers’ obsession with portfolio diversification and the
exploitation of excess returns in emerging markets. In this new  context of increasingly free
global capital flows,  interest rates now had an impact on both capital inflows and on the
exchange rate. Indeed, the early period of the Real Plan saw an appreciation by as much as 15%
in the Real-US dollar exchange rate, which was originally intended to have been maintained at
dollar parity. This real Real appreciation also  contributed to the rapidity of the decline in the
inflation rate. The introduction and early success of the Real Plan also reinforced the return of
net capital inflows by providing evidence of economic improvements, and reinforced the
reversal of the exchange rate policy of the previous period from maintaining competitiveness
through devaluation to maintaining competitiveness by creating pressure on domestic producers
from foreign imports. Since it was difficult for domestic producers to adjust their costs rapidly;
the real appreciation of the Real simply produced a growing payments imbalance  in the new
context of liberalised foreign trade.
The foreign capital flows that matched the growing trade imbalance also had an impact
on fiscal conditions, since the Central Bank adopted a policy of sterilisation of  inflows in order
to protect its inflation fighting monetary policy. This sterilisation, involving selling domestic
currency bonds at high interest rates to acquire foreign exchange that was invested at low
foreign interest rates,  produced  “negative carry” that fed directly into the current budget
deficit.  This reinforced the deterioration in the fiscal positions created by the rapid decline in
the inflation rate. Just as banks had been able to make politically influenced loans in the
knowledge that hyperinflation would quickly shrink them from the balance sheet, government
had been able to make expenditure commitments that were rapidly reduced in real terms. The
absence of inflation meant that the rate of growth of fiscal revenues fell while the already
approved indexed expenditures were slower to adjust, producing an increase in real
expenditures, some of which was visible in increased household incomes, producing a fall in the
saving rate and financing a consumption boom.
The rapid fall in inflation created rising real incomes as prices slowed more rapidly than
other asset prices and the prices of more liberalised imports fell with exchange rate appreciation.
This led to a rapid increase in consumption, in particular on imports. Finally banks were forced
to find real lending business to replace the inflation-float, and started to lend aggressively to
consumers in the absence of any quick pick up in business borrowing, adding further fuel to the5
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consumption boom driving imports.
Thus, while the Real Plan was immensely successful in eliminating inflation, the
continued reliance on  high interest rates reinforced the imbalances on foreign and domestic
account and reversed the economy from one of inertial inflation to tendential deflation. It was
this tendency to deflation that led to the exchange rate crisis under the Real plan. The best way
to understand it is by referring to Minsky’s favourite analytical technique: analyse the impact of
a change in interest rates on balance sheets. But, in the present case it is the government balance
sheet and the structure of its debt that will be of crucial importance. And, what will be required
is an analysis of the impact of changes in interest rates on the net present value of the Brazil and
Co.
A PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT DEFLATION PROCESS
First, it is important to note that the success of the Real Plan was on capital inflows buttressing
the nominal exchange rate anchor in the face of rising current account imbalances. The success
of the Plan thus made necessary domestic interest rates that were sufficiently  high to produce a
sufficiently large international interest rate differential to sustain capital inflows. Any attempt to
reduce rates unilaterally ran the risk of reducing the capital inflows and increasing vulnerability
to foreign shocks. Given the size and structure of government debt and expenditures, high
interest rates also  meant permanent fiscal imbalance through the impact of interest service on
the government deficit. The high interest rates that were required to ensure the capital inflows
that kept the exchange rate stable, along with trade liberalisation, produced a rising import
imbalance. The capital inflows in excess of what was required to finance the current account
imbalance was countered by sterilisation of the inflows at negative carry that also increased the
government deficit and thus  outstanding debt. Any attempt to offset this vicious circle which
did not involve interest rate reduction would require lower government expenditures, which
along with the high interest rates produced depressed internal demand and lower growth —  as
well as lower tax yields. The Real Plan could not restore Brazilian growth with price stability
because it contributed a distorted internal public debt structure and could not have adopted an
expansionary monetary policy, even if the government had desired one.
In addition, the Real Plan was introduced in the same year as the Mexican Tequila crisis
broke out in Latin America. This placed the entire strategy in jeopardy and required a policy
response of extremely high interest rates to protect Brazil from contagion and preserve capital
inflows. The result was to place further pressure on the fiscal deficit as the foreign balance
continued to deteriorate as the exchange rate continued to appreciate in real terms.  The decision
to introduce a controlled nominal depreciation of the currency was finally taken in 1995, but the
continued decline in the rate of inflation was sufficiently rapid that the new exchange rate6
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regime gave little relief to exporters and the real appreciation appears to have continued,
although with a declining nominal rate.
Although the return of capital flows to Brazil in the 1990s started as short-term
speculative flows, the stabilisation of the economy soon brought the return of foreign direct
investors. This reinforced the negative impact of liberalisation on the trade balance. Brazil had
been a relatively closed economy, and as such most Brazilian firms produced primarily for the
domestic market. Thus, even the liberalisation of the import of capital goods by domestic firms
did little to provide an offsetting increase in exports, while the operations of transnational
corporations involving the final assembly of semi-finished goods all tended to increase the
import content of exports and raise the trade deficit that would be associated with a given
growth rate. Or, to put the point differently,  the reduction in growth necessary to restore foreign
balance was continually increasing over the period after the introduction of the Real Plan. This
is a response similar to that of Mexico, but without the benefit of the linkage to the expanding
US economy. Indeed, Brazil was enjoying an internal consumption boom.
But there is another, often unnoticed impact of international financial market integration
and the use of high domestic interest rates to attract foreign investments. Since increasing global
capital flows meant an increasing proportion of Brazilian public debt came to be owned directly
or indirectly foreigners. Thus the rate of  interest effectively paid to foreign holders became the
domestic Brazilian rate. Further, increasing proportions of the debt were dollar indexed, but
paid domestic interest rates. The net result was that an increasing proportion of the domestic
Brazilian debt was  indexed to the overnight domestic interest rate, and thus an increasing
proportion of the externally owned debt was also linked to the domestic overnight rate. Just as
profits on  foreign direct investments, these interest earnings appear as a debit item on the
services, or liquid balance of payments. They represent the same threat of instability as the
unremitted profits of foreign direct investors.
5 Changes in domestic interest rates thus have an
increasing impact on the current account deficit as well as on the fiscal deficit and they may be
expected to move in tandem. This is a vicious circle that is similar to that caused by high
interest rates under the period of hyperinflation. To attract the capital inflows required to keep
the exchange on its target path and balance the fiscal and foreign deficits has required increases
in interest rates that simply increase the size of the foreign and fiscal deficits.  Fighting inflation
through exchange rate stability via increased interest rates has brought price stability, but at the
cost of the foreign balance which eventually undermines exchange rate stability. Indeed, this
policy has not only immobilised the interest rate as a policy tool, but it has also blunted fiscal
policy as a result of the impact of debt service on the deficit. Brazil is widely believed to have a
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fiscal crisis, but its ratio of fiscal pressure (tax take to GDP) is not far different from that of
most developed countries and like Italy it has had a primary government budget surplus
(although this has been due in some cases to the accounting of  revenues from privatisation) —
the deficit is entirely composed of debt service. Thus, continuous reduction in fiscal expenditure
is required to offset the impact of interest service on the debt, while  increasing exports are
required to offset the effect of higher interest rates on the services payments of the current
account balance.
While the success of the stabilisation policy in reducing inflation depended on large
capital inflows, the interest rates that this required  produced a deterioration in both the fiscal
and foreign balances that eventually created doubts about the long-term success of the policy
and a reversal of capital flows. In difference from Asia, virtually all market participants
recognised that the policy was not tenable as a long-term development strategy, and the capital
outflow occurred slowly, between July and January, rather than all at once. The result, however,
was exactly the same. A full scale exchange rate crisis.
PRIVATE SECTOR STABILITY AFTER THE REAL PLAN
Thus, the crisis in Brazil was due to the impact of rising interest rates on the public sector
balance sheet. The natural question to ask is why the Minsky crisis did not occur in the private
sector as it did in the Asian crisis and why the crisis was so much less severe.  While the locus
of crisis in Asia was private corporate and bank balance sheets, this was not the case in Brazil,
where there were only isolated banking insolvencies
6 and no major corporate failures.  As a
result of the country’s previous history of hyperinflation, the market for long-term capital was
not well developed, and firms held little fixed interest debt. Banks, on the other hand, had
survived the inflationary period by earning income from inflation arbitrage and treasury
operations,
7 and had advanced little in term lending to the private sector.  Thus the corporate
sector was not highly indebted to the banking system (although many banks held corporate
equity as an inflation hedge). In 1997 the average debt of the corporate sector was only 30 per
cent of owners’ equity. A survey of around 100 quoted Brazilian companies showed internal
funds averaged just under 60 percent , and equity around 20 percent of total funding, for the
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banking operations.
7 Inflationary transfers of income are estimated at some 4 per cent of national income and provided some 40 per
cent of bank earnings.8
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first three years of the Real Plan.
8  Firms thus relied on internal funding or had direct access to
rapidly developing equity markets. In addition they did not have large foreign-currency
exposures.
Loans represent less than half of bank assets in Brazil, and an increasing proportion of
lending was to households to finance consumption expenditures, much of which was in foreign
currency and created a threat of bankruptcy among households not seen in either East Asia or
the Russian Federation.  However, private banks in June 1997 are estimated to have had only 15
billion real in foreign-exchange denominated lending (only 21 per cent of total loans).  Only 19
per cent of their liabilities was foreign-currency denominated, although the figure may have
been as high as 50 per cent for foreign-owned banks.  Thus, banks do not have the kind of
currency mismatches that characterized other recent crises.
9
Furthermore, Brazil had just emerged from a major restructuring of the banking sector
following the banking crisis that started in 1994-1995.
10  From July 1994 to December 1997 the
central bank intervened in 43 banks, 32 of which were private, and liquidated all but one of the
latter
11.  Strict supervisory and regulatory provisions were also introduced, with capital
adequacy requirements stricter than those in the Basle Capital Accord.
12  As much as 20% of the
Government’s outstanding debt was created as part of this process of Bank restructuring.  Thus,
unlike in East Asia, it was the Government and the central bank which were most exposed in
foreign currencies through the issue of dollar-linked debt to both foreigners and residents, in
particular to banks which used it to hedge their exposure when providing forward cover to
commercial clients.
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9  Cf. IMF, Brazil: Recent Economic Developments.  IMF Staff Country Report, No. 98/24, Washington, DC, April
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10 As part of the liberalization of trade and finance in the late 1980s Brazil liberalized the licensing of new
banks by domestic (but not foreign) entities.  Many of the entities founded since the late 1980s came to grief
with the rise in interest rates that took place at the time of the Mexican crisis and during the attempt to calm the
boom generated by the introduction of the Plan Real.  80 per cent of all interventions took place after the
introduction of the Plan.
11 If the period is extended to December 1998 the number of banks liquidated or absorbed by other banks rises to
76 out of a total of 271 with the cost of the restructuring reaching 11% of 1998 GDP.
12 Further information on the restructuring of the Brazilian banking system can be found in IMF, Brazil: Recent
Economic Developments, op. cit..9
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While an increasing proportion of  capital inflows into Brazil were for direct investment,
even when the inflows financed Brazilian imports of capital goods,
13 they were used to increase
capacity to serve the large internal market and thus generated little in the way of increased
export earnings for the service of external debt.  One of the features of rapid development in
East Asia had been the ability to insure that the inflows were invested in export capacity that
provided foreign exchange for debt service. This reflects the higher share of investment in Asia
compared to Brazil. Indeed, the difficulties started in many Asian countries when returns on
such investments fell and the continuing capital inflows were invested in financial engineering
and real estate.
The Brazilian crisis had other special features.  Although it had widely expected been to
produce a collapse in the entire region, or even a major global market break, thus far it has
produced neither. In difference from Asia, Brazil is a relatively closed economy, its imports
accounted for only around 1% of global imports in 1997. Further, regional integration is much
more recent than in Asia; while 22% of Brazilian imports are from Latin America,  65 per cent
come from developed countries; and about 16 per cent from Mercosur partners.
Whereas the East Asian crisis had been characterized as a private rather than sovereign
debt crisis, the greatest foreign exposure in Brazil was that of the public sector.  In East Asia the
process of economic collapse was one of debt deflation, as the private sector sold domestic
currency to repay foreign loans, and sold domestic stocks and even equipment to repay debt
because of the extremely high internal interest rates.  Brazil, on the other hand, while it also sold
assets in an attempt to forestall the crisis, the sales took the form of the privatization of large
portions of the public sector which covered a substantial proportion of the current account
financing needs and had, if anything, a positive impact on the balance sheets of the entities
involved.
In Brazil the major damage to the private productive sector was due to the impact on
demand and capital costs of the attempt to avoid crisis by defending the exchange rate.  Industry
suffered from penal interest rates from the autumn of that year, that peaked at monthly rates of
4.5 per cent on working capital loans at the end of 1997 and never fell below 3.3 per cent during
1998 even though inflation had virtually fallen to zero.  On the other hand, the principal focus
of government policy was on improving the fiscal balance, through, inter alia, a reduction of
expenditure by 3 per cent of GDP.  The depreciation of the currency improved competitiveness
without producing large losses on the balance sheets of private enterprise, but since the outbreak
of the crisis Brazil (like East Asia before it) has been plagued by the disappearance of trade
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credits, and the improvements that have taken place in the foreign account have been primarily
due to import cuts.  Moreover, although the stabilization of the currency has allowed the Central
Bank to reduce interest rates, to around 22 per cent by the beginning of the summer, these
reductions have not yet fed through to private-sector lending rates.
14
On the other hand, the crisis had also a number of positive aspects for the private sector.
Banks had been large holders of dollar-linked government debt in their portfolios, and a number
of investment banks reported record profits as the result of futures positions taken in
anticipation of the depreciation of the currency. This is another reason for the relatively benign
character of the crisis.  Since Brazil was one of the first countries to have been hit by contagion
from other regions, there was clear advance warning of possible difficulties.  Further, it was
widely accepted that the currency was overvalued.  Thus foreign and domestic investors were
given adequate time to make an orderly withdrawal of capital and arrange for necessary
hedging, as well as  to unravel complicated derivative strategies, well before the country ran out
of reserves.  Indeed, the devaluation had been so widely anticipated that several investment
banks incorporated the impact of a possible devaluation in their growth forecasts for 1999 as
early as the last quarter of 1998.  Many private banks returned to the international capital
markets at the end of the first quarter before the Government launched a Brady swap issue in
April.
After the East Asian crisis it became widely recognized that target levels of fiscal
surpluses agreed with IMF had contributed to the depth of the recession.  Thus they were
revised to allow Governments the possibility of running fiscal deficits.  However, in Brazil this
has not been the case, and even larger primary surpluses  to offset the increased costs of debt
service caused by the depreciation of the currency have been part of the conditions for the
provision of multilateral lending. One reason for this  may have been fear that the devaluation
would rekindle hyperinflation.  But after a one-off rise in prices the inflation rate has come
down to levels similar to that before the crisis.  Nevertheless, even though the entire fiscal
deficit is due to interest payments and the effects of higher obligations on foreign-currency debt
brought about by the collapse of the currency, Brazil is aiming for a primary surplus of 3.2 per
cent of GDP in 1999.
While the crisis in Brazil has had a relatively limited contagion effect, its domestic
implications are rather similar to those for the Russian economy.  In the run up to the
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devaluation, forecasts of the impact on the real economy of the high interest rates and
government austerity necessary to defend the exchange rate were for a contraction of  4-6 per
cent in 1999.  The implication was that the key to reducing the government deficit and debt was
unlikely to lie in raising the primary surplus, since reduced spending or increased taxes needed
for such a fiscal adjustment would squeeze the private sector and prove counter-productive.
Rather, interest rates would need to be reduced below  the growth rate of the economy, failing
which there would be a risk of prolonged economic stagnation as restrictive policies were
increasingly applied to reduce the debt but simply creased the deficit and outstanding debt. The
floating of the currency reduced the need for these restrictive measures to manage the currency
and thus growth forecasts were quickly revised upwards. Thus, Brazilian policy faces a
dilemma which cannot be resolved by measures that restrict output growth below its potential.
Is this a crisis? Delfim Netto estimates that the current rate of growth of the Brazilian
labour force is around 2.7% per annum and that productivity growth is around 3.5%, which
means that Brazil requires a growth rate in excess of 6% to keep the level of unemployment
from rising. There seems to be no plausible way the economy will be able to generate that rate
of growth without drastically reducing interest rates. Just as Italy and the UK in 1992 were
judged to have exchange rate targets (and thus interest rate policies) that were incompatible with
politically acceptable rate of unemployment, Brazil was also so judged by international markets
by the end of 1998. Given the interest rates that prevailed in Brazil before the outbreak of the
crisis, the policy was already untenable, since export growth was not sufficient to cover the
increasing deficit on the services balance. The Asian crisis forced the issue by pushing up
interest rates to levels which produced visible changes in both the foreign and fiscal balance and
forced the introduction of fiscal austerity policies which made the impact on employment
growth clear and visible. The slow drain of reserves and the slow flight of foreign investors
15
meant that a meltdown of the Asian style was avoided, but no amount of additional reserves in
could change the basic fact that the interest rate on most of the outstanding debt obligations was
higher than either the rate of growth of the economy or the rate of growth of exports, and thus
neither the fiscal nor the foreign balance could improve without a drastic fall in interest rates.
The exchange rate thus had to be left to the market.
There are some who suggest that this will be achieved as Brazil produces a large export
surplus as a result of the devaluation. But, much like the initial Asian response, and given the
Brazilian structure of trade after liberalisation, the trade surplus is being produced through a fall
in imports that is more rapid than the fall in exports, as the sharp decline in incomes cuts
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consumption and imports. This suggests that any decline in interest rates that leads to a
resumption in growth high enough to reduce unemployment is likely to recreate the foreign
imbalance, requiring a return to high interest rates and more fiscal austerity leading to another
reduction in growth. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVE
The real question facing Brazil in identifying an alternative strategy is what the aim of policy is
to be. Is it to borrow more from abroad by restoring confidence in the currency and attracting
foreign lenders or is it to earn more by attracting foreign buyers for Brazilian output? Is the aim
of fiscal policy to reduce the deficit by cutting expenditures or by increasing the rate of growth
of gdp. If it is to be the latter, then the recent return to capital markets is not a sign of health, but
of weakness. The failure of exports to expand is not a sign of health, but of weakness, as is the
recovery of the exchange rate. If improvement is an increase in capital inflows, an appreciation
of the currency, but interest rates above 20%, then the Brazilian crisis, following the path of
Mexico, will not be the last.
In domestic capital markets, lenders are supposed to exercise diligence and governance
in order to insure that no borrower becomes excessively leveraged so as to present a threat to
the stability of the financing system. The example of LCTM in the US suggests that even in the
most advanced form of governance, supervision and control, the market is not capable of
imposing discipline in time to limit exposures to safe levels. This has now been admitted even
by those who champion the minimum amount of regulation and maximum amount of freedom
in capital markets (cf President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999, p. viii). Global
market mechanisms are even less well developed, which suggests that the responsibility for
limiting leverage to that which is compatible with domestic economic stability must lie with
national governments. This implies some for of rationing of capital inflows when they exceed
that which an economy can safely absorb in the context of its domestic stability policies. Given
the strong qualifications required for the validity of the Modigliani-Miller theorem (which says
that capital structure has no impact on a firm’s performance) finance economists have
investigated the optimal degree of leverage for an individual firm. Perhaps it would be more
appropriate if instead of discussing the control of capital flows the question were posed in terms
of the optimal degree of leverage for a developing country.13
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